BEING AND TIME

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Translated by
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Foreword by
Taylor Carman
Dedicated to
EDMUND HUSSELR
in friendship and admiration
Todtnauberg in Baden, Black Forest
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“Upon-which”, is what ‘really’ ‘has meaning’ first of all. Entities ‘have’ meaning only because, as Being which has been disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the projection of that Being—that is to say, in terms of the “upon-which” of that projection. The primary projection of the understanding of Being ‘gives’ the meaning. The question about the meaning of the Being of an entity takes as its theme the “upon-which” of that understanding of Being which underlies all Being of entities.

Dasein is either authentically or inauthentically disclosed to itself as regards its existence. In existing, Dasein understands itself, and in such a way, indeed, that this understanding does not merely get something in its grasp, but makes up the existentiell Being of its factual potentiality-for-Being. The Being which is disclosed is that of an entity for which this Being is an issue. The meaning of this Being—that is, of care—is what makes care possible in its Constitution; and it is what makes up primordially the Being of this potentiality-for-Being. The meaning of Dasein’s Being is not something free-floating which is other than and ‘outside of’ itself, but is the self-understanding Dasein itself. What makes possible the Being of Dasein, and therewith its factual existence?

That which was projected in the primordial existential projection of existence has revealed itself as anticipatory resoluteness. What makes this authentic Being-a-whole of Dasein possible with regard to the unity of its articulated structural whole? Anticipatory resoluteness, when taken formally and existentially, without our constantly designating its full structural content, is Being towards one’s ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being. This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself—in other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-‘come-towards-itself’ in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards, if either authentic or

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1 'Die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins eines Seienden macht das Woraufhin des allem Sein von Seiendem zugrundeliegenden Seinsverstehens zum Thema.' The earlier editions read '4... des allem deutschen Seins zuzu Seiendem...'.
2 'Was ermöglicht dieses eigentümliche Ganzein des Daseins hinsichtlich der Einheit seines gegliederten Strukturganzen?'
3 'Das die ausgezeichnete Möglichkeit aushaltende, in ihr sich auf sich Zukunftlassen ist das ursprüngliche Phänomen der Zu-kunft.' While the hyphen in 'Zukunftlassen' appears only in the later editions, the more important hyphen in 'Zukunft' appears in both earlier and later editions. In the later editions, however, it comes at the end of the line, so that the force which was presumably intended is lost.
4 Without the hyphen, 'Zukunft' is the ordinary word for 'the future'; with the hyphen, Heidegger evidently wishes to call attention to its kinship with the expression 'zukommen.'
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primordial and authentic, the primordial phenomenon, which we have described only in a rough and ready fashion, must first be worked out correctly.

If resoluteness makes up the mode of authentic care, and if this itself is possible only through temporality, then the phenomenon at which we have arrived by taking a look at resoluteness, must present us with only a modality of temporality, by which, after all, care as such is made possible. Dasein's totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). When we first fixed upon this articulated structure, we suggested that with regard to this articulation the ontological question must be pursued still further back until the unity of the totality of this structural manifoldness has been laid bare. The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.

The “ahead-of-itself” is grounded in the future. In the “Being-already-in . . .”, the character of “having been” is made known. “Being-alongside . . .” becomes possible in making present. While the “ahead” includes the notion of a “before”, neither the ‘before’ in the ‘ahead’ nor the ‘already’ is to be taken in terms of the way time is ordinarily understood; this has been automatically ruled out by what has been said above. With this ‘before’ we do not have in mind ‘in advance of something’ [das “Vorher”] in the sense of ‘not yet now—but later’; the ‘already’ is just as far from signifying ‘no longer now—but earlier’. If the expressions ‘before’ and ‘already’ were to have a time-oriented [zeitliche] signification such as this (and they can have this signification too), then to say that care has temporality would be to say that it is something which is ‘earlier’ and ‘later’, ‘not yet’ and ‘no longer’. Care would then be conceived as an entity which occurs and runs its course ‘in time’. The Being of an entity having the character of Dasein would become something present-at-hand. If this sort of thing is impossible, then any time-oriented signification which the expressions we have mentioned may have, must be different from this. The ‘before’ and the ‘ahead’ indicate the future as of a sort which would make it possible for Dasein to be such that its potentiality-for-Being is an issue.

Self-projection upon the ‘for-the-sake-of-one-self’ is grounded in

1 On our expressions ‘having presence’, ‘making present’, and ‘the Present’, see our notes 1 and 2, p. 47, and 2, p. 48 on H. 25 above.
2 “Die Gewissheit erspricht der Zukunft, so zwar, dass die gewesene (besser gewesene) Zukunft die Gegenwart aus sich entlässt. Heidegger has coined the term ‘gewesen’ by fusing the past participle ‘gewesen’ with the suffix of the present participle ‘-end’, as in English one would write ‘been’.
3 ‘Dies dergestalt als gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft einheitliche Phänomen nennen wir die Zeitlichkeit.'
the future and is an essential characteristic of existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality is the future.

Likewise, with the 'already' we have in view the existential temporal meaning of the Being of that entity which, in so far as it is, is already something that has been thrown. Only because care is based on the character of 'having been', can Dasein exist as the thrown entity which it is. 'As long as' Dasein factically exists, it is never past [vergangen], but it always is indeed as already having been, in the sense of the 'I am-as-having-been'. And only as long as Dasein is, can it be as having been. On the other hand, we call an entity 'past', when it is no longer present-at-hand. Therefore Dasein, in existing, can never establish itself as a fact which is present-at-hand, arising and passing away 'in the course of time', with a bit of it past already. Dasein never 'finds itself' except as a thrown Fact. In the state-of-mind in which it finds itself, Dasein is assailed by itself as the entity which it still is and already was—that is to say, which it constantly is as having been.¹ The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in the character of 'having been'. In our formulation of the structure of care, the temporal meaning of existentiality and facticity is indicated by the expressions 'before' and 'already'.

On the other hand, we lack such an indication for the third item which is constitutive for care—the Being-alongside which falls. This should not signify that falling is not also grounded in temporality; it should instead give us a hint that making-present, as the primary basis for falling into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves, remains included in the future and in having been, and is included in these in the mode of primordial temporality. When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' in the moment of vision as regards the Situation which has been disclosed.²

Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care. The items of care have not been pieced together cumulatively any more than temporality itself has been put together in the course of time ['mit der Zeit'] out of the future, the having been, and the Present.

¹ In der Befindlichkeit wird das Dasein von ihm selbst überfallen als das Seiende, das es, noch seien, schon war, das heisst gewesen ständig ist. We have expanded our usual translation of 'Befindlichkeit' to bring out better the connection with the previous sentence.

² Entschlossen hat sich das Dasein gerade zurückgeholt aus dem Verfallen, um desto eigentlicher im 'Augenblick' auf die erschlossene Situation 'da' zu sein. The German word 'Augenblick' has hitherto been translated simply as 'moment'; but here, and in many later passages, Heidegger has in mind its more literal meaning—a glance of the eye'. In such passages it seems more appropriate to translate it as 'moment of vision'. See Section 68 below, especially II. 336.

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Temporality 'is' not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporizes itself. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid saying, 'Temporality "is" ... the meaning of care', 'Temporality "is" ... defined in such and such a way'; the reason for this can be made intelligible only when we have clarified the idea of Being and that of the 'is' in general. Temporality temporizes, and indeed it temporizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein's modes of Being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence.

The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the 'towards-oneself', the 'back-to', and the 'letting oneself-be-encountered-by'.¹ The phenomena of the "towards ...", the "to ...", and the "alongside ...", make temporality manifest as the ekvaurov one pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the "ectases" of temporality.² Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporализing in the unity of the ectases. What is characteristic of the 'time' which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of "nowns", without beginning and without end, in which the ectatical character of primordial temporality has been levelled off. But this very levelling off, in accordance with its existential meaning, is grounded in the possibility of a definite kind of temporализing, at conformity with which temporality temporizes as inauthentic the kind of 'time' we have just mentioned. If, therefore, we demonstrate that the 'time' which is accessible to Dasein's common sense is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, in accordance with the principle, "a pottori fit denominatio", we are justified in designating as "primordial time" the temporality which we have now laid bare.

¹ Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart zeigen die phänomenalen Charaktere des 'Auf-Sich-zu', des "Zurück auf", des "Begegnenlassens von ...'. On these expressions cf. H. 326 above.

² Die Phänomene des zu ..., auf ..., bei ..., offenbaren die Zeitlichkeit als das ekvaurov schlechthin. Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprüngliche "Aussere-sich" an und für sich selbst. Wir nennen daher die charakterisierten Phänomene Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart die Ectasen der Zeitlichkeit.

The connection of the words 'zu', 'auf', and 'bei' with the expressions listed in the preceding sentence, is somewhat obscure even in the German, and is best clarified by a study of the preceding pages. Briefly the correlation seems to be as follows:

zu: Zukunft; auf sich zukommen; Sich-zukommen auf:
zu: Zukunft; zurückkommen auf; Zurück auf;
bei: Gegenwart; Begegnenlassens von; Sein-bei.

The root-meaning of the word 'ektasis' (Greek ektasis; German, 'Ektase') is 'standing outside'. Used generally in Greek for the 'removal' or 'displacement' of something, it came to be applied to states-of-mind which we would now call 'ectastic'. Heidegger usually keeps the basic root-meaning in mind, but he also keenly aware of its close connection with the root-meaning of the word 'existence'.
In enumerating the ecstatics, we have always mentioned the future first. We have done this to indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality. This is so, even though temporality does not first arise through a cumulative sequence of the ecstatics, but in each case temporalsizes itself in their equiprimordiality. But within this equiprimordiality, the modes of temporalsizing are different. The difference lies in the fact that the nature of the temporalsizing can be determined primarily in terms of the different ecstatics. Primordial and authentic temporality temporalsizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. The priority of the future will vary according to the ways in which the temporalsizing of inauthentic temporality itself is modified, but it will still come to the fore even in the derivative kind of 'time'.

Care is Being-towards-death. We have defined "anticipatory resoluteness" as authentic Being towards the possibility which we have characterized as Dasein's utter impossibility. In such Being-towards-its-end, Dasein exists in a way which is authentically whole as that entity which it can be when 'thrown into death'. This entity does not have an end at which it just stops, but it exists finitely. The authentic future is temporalsized primarily by that temporality which makes up the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness; it then reveals itself as finite. But 'does not time go on' in spite of my own no-longer-Dasein. And can there not be an unlimited number of things which still lie 'in the future' and come along out of it?

We must answer these questions affirmatively. In spite of this, they do not contain any objections to the finitude of primordial temporality—because this is something which is no longer handled by these at all. The question is not about everything that still can happen 'in a time that goes on', or about what kind of letting-come-towards-oneself we can encounter 'out of this time', but about how 'coming-towards-oneself' is, as such, to be temporally defined. Its finitude does not amount primarily to a stopping, but is a characteristic of temporalsizing itself. The primordial and authentic future is the "towards-oneself" (to oneself), existing as the possibility of nullity, the possibility which is not to be outstripped. The ecstatical character of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that the future closes one's potentiality-for-Being; that is to say, the future itself is closed to one, and as such it makes possible the resolute existential understanding of nullity. Primordial and authentic coming-towards-oneself is the meaning of existing in one's ownmost nullity. In our thesis that temporality is primordially finite, we are not disputing that 'time goes on'; we are simply holding fast to the phenomenal character of primordial temporality—a character which shows itself in what is projected in Dasein's primordial existential projecting.

The temptation to overlook the finitude of the primordial and authentic future and therefore the finitude of temporality, or alternatively, to hold 'a priori' that such finitude is impossible, arises from the way in which the ordinary understanding of time is constantly thrusting itself to the fore. If the ordinary understanding is right in knowing a time which is endless, and in knowing only this, it has not yet been demonstrated that it also understands this time and its 'infinity'. What does it mean to say, 'Time goes on' or 'Time keep passing away'? What is the significan of 'in time' in general, and of the expressions 'in the future' and 'out of the future' in particular? In what sense is 'time' endless? Such points need to be cleared up, if the ordinary objections to the finitude of primordial time are not to remain groundless. But we can clear them up effectively only if we have obtained an appropriate way of formulating the question as regards finitude and in-finitude. Such a formulation, however, arises only if we view the primordial phenomenon of time understandingly. The problem is not one of how the 'derived' ['abgeteiltete'] infinite time, 'in which the ready-to-hand arises and passes away, becomes primordial finite temporality; the problem is rather that of how inauthentic temporality arises out of finite authentic temporality, and how inauthentic temporality, as inauthentic, temporalsizes an in-finite time out of the finite. Only because primordial time is finite can the 'derived' time temporalsize itself as infinite. In the order in which we get things into our grasp through the understanding, the finitude of time does not become fully visible until we have exhibited 'endless time' so that these may be contrasted.
Our analysis of primordial temporality up to this point may be summarized in the following theses. Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ectsical. Temporality temporizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite.

However, the Interpretation of care as temporality cannot remain restricted to the narrow basis obtained so far, even if it has taken us the first steps along our way in viewing Dasein's primordial and authentic Being-a-whole. The thesis that the meaning of Dasein is temporality must be confirmed in the concrete content of this entity's basic state, as it has been set forth.

\[66.\] Dasein's Temporality and the Tasks Arising Therefrom of Repeating the Existential Analysis in a more Primordial Manner

Not only does the phenomenon of temporality which we have laid bare demand a more widely-ranging confirmation of its constitutive power, but only through such confirmation will it itself come into view as regards the basic possibilities of temporality. The demonstration of the possibility of Dasein's state of being on the basis of temporality will be designated in brief—though only provisionally—as "the 'temporal' Interpretation'.

Our next task is to go beyond the temporal analysis of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole and a general characterization of the temporality of care so that Dasein's inauthenticity may be made visible in its own specific temporality. Temporality first showed itself in anticipatory resoluteness. This is the authentic mode of disclosedness, though disclosedness maintains itself for the most part in the inauthenticity with which the "they" fallingly interprets itself. In characterizing the temporality of disclosedness in general, we are led to the temporal understanding of that concernful Being-in-the-world which lies closest to us, and therefore of the average undifferentiatedness of Dasein from which the existential analytic first took its start.\[xlv\] We have called Dasein's average kind of Being, in which it maintains itself proximally and for the most part, "everydayness". By repeating the earlier analysis, we must reveal everydayness in its temporal meaning, so that the problematic included in temporality may come to light, and the seemingly 'obvious' character of the preparatory analyses may completely disappear. Indeed, confirmation is to be found for temporality in all the essential structures of Dasein's basic constitution. Yet this will not lead to running through our analyses again superficially and schematically in the same sequence of presentation. The course of our temporal analysis is directed otherwise: it is to make plainer the interconnection of our earlier considerations and to do away with whatever is accidental and seemingly arbitrary. Beyond these necessities of method, however, the phenomenon itself gives us motives which compel us to articulate our analysis in a different way when we repeat it.

The ontological structure of that entity which, in each case, I myself am, centres in the Self-substinance [Selbständigkeit] of existence. Because the Self cannot be conceived either as substance or as subject but is grounded in existence, our analysis of the inauthentic Self, the "they", has been left wholly in tow of the preparatory Interpretation of Dasein.\[xxv\] Now that Selfhood has been explicitly taken back into the structure of care, and therefore of temporality, the temporal Interpretation of Self-constancy and non-Self-constancy\[x\] acquires an importance of its own. This Interpretation needs to be carried through separately and thematically. However, it not only gives us the right kind of insurance against the paralogisms and against ontologically inappropriate questions about the Being of the "I" in general, but it provides at the same time, in accordance with its central function, a more primordial insight into the temporalization-structure of temporality, which reveals itself as the historicality of Dasein. The proposition, "Dasein is historical", is confirmed as a fundamental existential ontological assertion. This assertion is far removed from the mere ontical establishment of the fact that Dasein occurs in a 'world-history'. But the historicality of Dasein is the basis for a possible kind of historiological understanding which in turn carries with it the possibility of getting a special grasp of the development of historiology as a science.

By interpreting everydayness and historicality temporally we shall get a steady enough view of primordial time to expose it as the condition which makes the everyday experience of time both possible and necessary. As an entity for which its Being is an issue, Dasein utilizes itself primarily for itself [verwendet sich . . . für sich selbst], in being so explicitly or not. Proximally and for the most part, care is circumpective concern. In utilizing itself for the sake of itself, Dasein 'uses itself up'. In using itself up, Dasein uses itself—that is to say, its time.\[2\] In using time, Dasein reckons with it. Time is first discovered in the concern which reckons


\[2\] 'Umwollen seiner selbst verwendet, "verbraucht" sich das Dasein. Sichverbruchend braucht das Dasein sich selbst, dass bringt seine Zeit.' Here these three verbs, all of which might sometimes be translated as 'use', are contrasted rather subtly. 'Verwenden' means literally to 'turn something away'; but is often used in the sense of 'turning something to account', 'utilizing it'; in a reflexive construction such as we have here, it often takes on the more special meaning of 'applying oneself' on someone's behalf. (In previous passages we have generally translated 'verwenden' as 'use'.) 'Verbrauchen' means to 'consume' or 'use up', 'Verbrauchen' too means to 'use'; but it also means to 'need', and it is hard to tell which of these senses Heidegger here has in mind.